

## **The European Migration Crisis**

A theoretical discussion of responsibility for structural injustices evident within the European migration crisis from a political science, political theory, and legal perspective.

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### Abstract

Increased political instabilities in the Middle East and North Africa have led to an increase in the influx of refugees trying to enter and seek asylum in Europe. In trying to overcome this, European states have actively sought to prevent asylum seekers from accessing their territory through the establishment of “Fortress Europe” policies. This bachelor thesis discusses the responsibilities of European states and individual European citizens with regard to the European migration crisis in the context of border control policies and their impact on refugee treatment and the structural injustices pertaining to it. I will first elaborate on structural injustices, the *social connection model of responsibility*, and the *liability model of responsibility* as defined by Iris Marion Young (2006). Subsequently, I will develop an understanding of the relationship between structural injustices and the Global North/ South divide and how this plays out in migration processes. Subsequently, I will elaborate on the concept of populism and its influences on the European migration crisis, typically concerning populism’s demands for the exclusion of migrants within a single nation-state to preserve national identity. I will argue that the European migration crisis constitutes a deliberate structural injustice for which European states are responsible in the form of a liability. Additionally, I will argue that this structural injustice is perpetuated by populism for which European citizens have a political responsibility to address this injustice in line with the social connection model of responsibility.

*Keywords:* Migration, the European migration crisis, European border control policies, deliberate structural injustices, Global North/ South divide, populism, responsibility

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## 1. The European Migration Crisis

Over the course of nearly twenty years, approximately 60 million people have been displaced due to conflict, violence, and persecution (AI, 2016(b)). This has led to the so-called European migration crisis (Almustafa, 2022). This term is used to describe the process by which millions of people have fled from war zones in the Middle East and Africa to seek refuge in Europe (AI, 2016(b)). As a result of the growing number of asylum seekers<sup>1</sup>, European government institutions have become overloaded. In trying to overcome this, European states have actively sought to prevent asylum seekers from accessing their territory (AI, 2016(b)). In what have been dubbed “Fortress Europe” policies, European states have erected fences at land borders, deployed ever larger numbers of border guards, and struck deals with neighbouring countries to keep people out (AI, 2015(a)). Border control policies and migration control policies work in such a way that through humanitarian assistance, migration control is outsourced to European bordering countries. In this way, refugees and migrants are contained in bordering countries with little to no possibility of reaching Europe. European states have a responsibility to protect refugees in need of protection as established in the 1951 Refugee Convention (UNHCR, 1954). However, refugees are increasingly found to be in devastating conditions lacking protection and care as a result of European border control policies which, inherently, are inadequate to honour the international community’s responsibility to protect. As a result, European states have, by failing to meet their responsibilities for protection, enhanced an already existing structural injustice between the Global North (GN) and the Global South (GS)<sup>2</sup>, also evident in migration. Due to European

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<sup>1</sup> In this bachelor thesis, the terms refugees, migrants and asylum seekers are used interchangeably. However, within the context of this thesis, they are all understood as follows: ‘people who have lost the protection of their state of origin or nationality’ (UNHCR, 1954).

<sup>2</sup> Within the context of this thesis, the Global North is understood as Europe and the Global South is understood as Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

border control policies focused on humanitarian assistance, European states deliberately impose on refugees conditions of deprivation and domination by detaining refugees in neighbouring countries. Through these policies, European states also particularly benefit from positive discrimination, the act of giving an advantage to certain migrants based on their education and skills, which will be elaborated on further in Chapter 3. Therefore, in line with definitions of structural injustice, as provided by Young (2006) and McKeown (2023), I will argue that European states have a responsibility in the form of a liability for the deliberate structural injustices evident within the European migration crisis through European border control policies.

I will extend the responsibility of European states to European citizens by appealing to their political responsibility. Due to the European migration crisis, there has been an increase in populism, which is inherently against multiculturalism (Modebadze, 2019). I argue that this has in turn negatively influenced the European migration crisis as rejecting migrants' claims for inclusion and limiting migrants' rights have been one of the flagship proposals of populism (Valeri, 2019; CoE Secretary General, 2017; Stoyanova, & Smet, 2022). With the increase in populist parties in Europe, there is an increased threat towards multiculturalism, pluralism, and migration influencing national and international politics and further constraining European refugee protection (Valeri, 2019). I will argue that European citizens have a political responsibility to address these injustices arising from populism in line with the social connection model.

Therefore, in this bachelor thesis, I will argue that the European migration crisis is a deliberate structural injustice for which European states have a responsibility in line with the liability model and for which European citizens have a political responsibility in line with the social connection model. Specifically, this bachelor thesis aims to answer the following

research question: *“Who bears responsibility for structural injustices evident within the European migration crisis?”* To answer this research question, I will first explore the European migration regime and the implemented border control and migration control policies to make informed judgements on any structural injustices that might be in place as a result of those policies in Chapter 2. Then, in Chapter 3, I will explain what structural injustices are and how they are generally understood. Additionally, I will provide an understanding of the liability model of responsibility, the social connection model of responsibility, and the model of political responsibility in line with definitions given by Young (2003, 2006). I will also introduce an understanding of migration as a structural injustice based on migrants being subject to systematic domination and deprivation of their means to develop and exercise their basic human rights, capacities, and freedoms. Subsequently, in Chapter 4, I will elaborate on why European border control policies are still maintained, despite their adverse effects on the protection of refugees, by looking into the rise of populism which has allowed European states to increase their border control management resulting in the exclusion of refugees in need of protection. To further illustrate this, I will introduce two examples of populism in Dutch politics to illustrate the political responsibility of European citizens and to illustrate how this plays out in national politics. Finally, I will provide a conclusion presenting an overview of the concepts discussed in this bachelor thesis leading up to my understanding of, and answer to, the research question: *“The European migration crisis constitutes a deliberate structural injustice for which European states are responsible in the form of a liability. The structural injustices evident are perpetuated by populism and European citizens have a political responsibility to address this injustice in line with the social connection model of responsibility.”*

## **2. Background Information**

In this chapter, I will outline the following concepts, which are necessary to understand the current European migration crisis: the unconditional protective competence of the international community, the principle of non-refoulement, and border control policies in the form of humanitarian assistance. These concepts will help me further develop and defend my argument on the responsibilities of European states and European citizens for structural injustices within the European migration crisis.

### **2. 1. The Unconditional Protective Competence of the International Community**

First, it is important to define what refugees are and how they are perceived before we can go into states' reluctance to honour them. The 1951 Refugee Convention, the most important convention concerning the status of refugees, defines refugees as: 'people who have lost the protection of their state of origin or nationality'. According to Article 1, the term refugee applies to anyone who:

[...] owes a well-rounded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; that is outside the country of his nationality and that is unable or unwilling to avail himself to the protection of that country, or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events is unable to or unwilling to return to it (UNHCR, 1954).

There are thus two important concerns to be identified within this definition, further outlined by Hathaway (2007). These two fundamental concerns are 1) refugees are deserving of protection in view not just of their movement to avoid the risk of serious harm, but because of the fundamental social disenfranchisement that gives rise to the underlying risk, and 2) among the population of disfranchised persons who have moved to avoid risk to basic rights, the presence of refugees outside their state brings them within the unconditional protective competence of the international community (Hathaway, 2007; Almustafa, 2022). According to this understanding, refugees should thus be protected by the international community as a whole.

It is this unconditional protective competence of the international community that entails the fundamental duty that states have towards their population and anyone, including refugees, within their territory. As the 1951 Refugee Convention is legally binding, EU member states are bound by their unconditional protective competence. However, following the international law principles on jurisdiction; whether refugees fall within the scope of a state's jurisdiction depends on whether they are within that state's territory (Hernández, 2022). As such, each member state is responsible for the granting or rejecting of asylum applications as embedded within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) which aims to increase joint policy and law-making among European states in terms of migration and asylum (Schittenhelm, 2019; Doomernik, & Glorius, 2022). This is affirmed by the European Parliament (1999):

The European Council reaffirms the importance the Union and member states attach to absolute respect of the right to seek asylum. It has agreed to work towards establishing a Common



European Asylum System, based on the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e., maintaining the principle of non-refoulement.

The principle of non-refoulement entails that migrants who are not admitted to Europe cannot be sent back to their country of origin if they are at risk of being prosecuted. The principle of non-refoulement is further embedded in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which states that “no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm” (Refugee Convention, 1951). This principle is internationally recognised within human rights law and applies to all migrants at all times, irrespective of migration status. The principle of non-refoulement is further established within the European migration regime through the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) which was put into place to further harmonise asylum procedures and better safeguard the rights of asylum applicants in Europe (Doomernik, & Glorius, 2022). Additionally, under the APD, it is recognised that applicants who are considered particularly vulnerable need special procedural guarantees (Velluti, 2014). The APD thus aims to guarantee the unconditional protective competence and takes the principle of non-refoulement into account.

As a result of Europe’s attempt to harmonise asylum procedures through the CEAS and the APD, a multitude of different policies focused on controlling migration flows have been created. Many of these policies are border control policies within which European states have increased their border control by placing fences at land borders, installing border guards, and negotiating with neighbouring countries to keep refugees out (Amnesty

International, 2015(a)). In the following section, I will elaborate on different European border control policies and their effects on migrants and the European migration crisis and how they might contribute to the creation or enhancement of existing structural injustices.

## **2. 2. Border-Control Policies based on Humanitarian Assistance**

European states are using humanitarian assistance as a form of border control policies to outsource their border control to cooperating, non-European countries in return for trade, aid, and development to prevent refugees from entering Europe. With this type of border control, European countries fail to honour their pledged unconditional protective competence.

There are different types of border control policies to be identified. However, for this bachelor thesis, the main focus will be on a very specific type of border control which is border control based on humanitarian assistance. With this type of border control, European states offer aid, trade, and development to non-European countries in return for those countries controlling European borders in such a way that only admittance in exceptional circumstances is possible (Casas, Cobarrubias, & Pickles, 2010). Next to economic opportunities in the form of aid, trade, and development, European states also aim to offer increased, selective, migration opportunities for high-educated and high-skilled workers. This results in the gross number of refugees not receiving adequate protection in correspondence with their needs and protection requirements as formulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. European states thus benefit from humanitarian assistance through the outsourcing of border control and through positive discrimination in the form of selective migration policies, which serve to exclude refugees in need of protection from entering Europe.

Still, humanitarianism, with regard to migration, was initially created to enhance protection opportunities. Globally, humanitarianism served to benefit both refugees and the local population of countries of asylum. Due to the initial increase in the refugee population,

mainly in the GS, the UNHCR formulated a ‘refugee aid and development’ strategy to assist the GS in refugee protection from the outset to thereby also enable further aid, trade, and development opportunities (Crisp, 2001). The goal was to help refugees become self-sufficient and integrated into a new country and to establish international development programs. The latter was based on the idea of ‘international burden sharing’ in which the GN would assist countries of asylum in the GS with the adverse impact of refugees on their economy, environment, and infrastructure (Crisp, 2001). However, at a global level, humanitarian assistance in the form of refugee aid and development programs seems seriously flawed (Crisp, 2001; Almustafa, 2022).

Even though the promise of humanitarian assistance forms an incentive for non-European states to cooperate with European migration policies, there are massive gaps to be perceived in humanitarian aid allocations despite European promises<sup>3</sup>. This gap reflects the minimal commitment of the states of the GN towards the European migration crisis and mirrors how un-sustainable their containment strategies are, which in the end, results in inhumane displacement and poor living conditions for refugees within camps and host communities (Almustafa, 2022). Specifically, through border control policies based on humanitarian assistance, European states benefit through the outsourcing of border control and positive discrimination towards skilled and highly-educated migrants. As a result, protection norms are not geared towards the protection of refugees but are rather tailored to serve the political agendas of powerful states, which primarily aim to outsource border control, govern refugees, and control their mobility in their regions away from the territories of the GN (Hathaway, 2001 in Almustafa, 2022).

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<sup>3</sup> The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2017) demonstrated that 93.5 million people across 33 crisis-affected countries required humanitarian aid constituting a global requirement of US\$22.5 billion in 2017. However, only US\$77.2 million was received in response to UN aid appeals, creating a gap of US\$22.4 billion (Almustafa, 2022).

Therefore, on a global level, humanitarianism serves to control certain groups of the global population and prevent them from reaching countries in the GN (Agier, 2011). Through this perception of humanitarianism, the global order in which the GN continues to dominate is protected through the development of “protective” barriers that close the GN off from the GS. This division has led to the “hardening” of Europe’s outer borders, also understood as externalisation; officially referred to as the “external dimension of European border management”, in which the task of border control is outsourced to non-European countries (Casas, Cobarrubias, & Pickles, 2010). This system limits refugees’ access to protection by controlling their mobility and excluding them from the GN through legal and administrative strategies such as restrictive visa regulations and the “safe country” concept (Johnson, 2011). The “safe country” concept includes a list of assumed “safe third countries” and “safe countries of origin”, such as Turkey and Tunisia, to which, in case someone is at risk of refoulement in their country of origin is sent after their asylum application is judged invalid (European Commission, 2016a; Chetail, 2016).

Border control based on humanitarian assistance and the safe country concept thus shift the unconditional protective competence of European states. With the majority of refugees coming from the GS, preferences for assisting refugees have shifted away from policies of resettlement towards forms of humanitarian governance and assistance of refugees within their camps in home regions as a function of externalisation (Johnson, 2011). As a result of this shift, refugees are increasingly found to be in devastating conditions lacking protection and care due to the implementation of these border control policies which, inherently, are inadequate to honour the unconditional protective competence of the international community.

Therefore, by implementing border control policies that are not focused on the protection of refugees but are rather tailored to serve the political agendas of powerful states, European states have deliberately created a structural injustice in which refugees are continuously deprived of their freedom of movement. In doing so, European states are neglecting their unconditional protective competence which they have pledged to implement and for which they thus have a responsibility. I will further elaborate on the topic of (deliberate) structural injustices and what this means in the context of the European migration crisis to further illustrate my argument in Chapter 3. Additionally, I will further elaborate on European states' responsibilities for the structural injustices evident and what this means in the context of their unconditional protective competence.

### 3. Migration as a Structural Injustice

In this chapter, I will discuss migration as a structural injustice. First, I will introduce a definition of structural injustice, as defined by Iris Marion Young. Following this definition, I will elaborate on the different types of responsibilities for structural injustice in line with Young's understanding of the *liability model of responsibility*, the *social connection model of responsibility*, and the *model of political responsibility*. I will further illustrate these with Young's example of sweatshops. I will then problematise her definition with McKeown's definition of deliberate structural injustices. Additionally, the GN/GS divide will be discussed to further illustrate how structural injustices are evident within the European migration crisis. Understanding structural injustices is necessary to further understand and elaborate on the responsibilities for structural injustices evident within the European migration crisis, specifically with regard to the responsibility of European states.

#### 3. 1. Structural Injustices

Before I go deeper into how migration can be related to structural injustices, it is important to define what structural injustices are and how they are typically created. Within political philosophy, instances of justice have typically been understood in terms of John Rawls' theory of justice. In his theory on justice, Rawls describes a definition of justice that focuses on the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.<sup>4</sup> In recent decades, this understanding of justice is critiqued by one of the field's most influential writers, Iris Marion Young (2006). Whereas Rawls focused on justice in an ideal society, Young focused on the injustice existing in society, specifically the structural injustices that are in place (McKeown, 2021). According to Young, differing social positions offer unequal

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<sup>4</sup> Rawls argued that structures of justice apply to the basic structure of society in which obligations of justice arise because of social cooperation among citizens. In *A Theory of Justice* (2020), Rawls argues that in a perfectly structured society, everyone decides upon their principles from behind a veil of ignorance which aims to erase people's awareness of their place in society so they cannot tailor principles of justice to their own advantage (Rawls, 2020).

opportunities and benefits to their occupants, and their relations are such that constrained opportunities and minimal benefits for some often correlate with wider opportunities and greater benefits for others (Young, 2011, 112). The injustice that arises from these differences in social positions and the relations between those and the actions and interactions of differently positioned persons have had and will have future effects beyond the immediate intentions of the actors. These injustices are ingrained in society and are social, economic, political, and institutional in character (Young, 2011, 112). As such, according to Young, structural injustices exist when:

[...] social processes put large categories of persons under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time as these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising their capacities. Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the willfully repressive policies of a state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting in pursuit of their particular goals and interests, within given institutional rules and accepted norms. All the persons who participate by their actions in the ongoing schemes of cooperation that constitute these structures are responsible for them, in the sense that they are part of the process that causes them. They are not responsible, however, in the sense of having

directed the process or intended its outcomes (Young, 2011, 114).

Structural injustices thus exist in the way they constrain and enable different people in their actions and opportunities and they are reflected in the social, political, economic, and institutional order of societies. As can be inferred from the definition by Young, structural injustices are not subject to one's individual responsibility for an action, but rather, to the individual responsibility of everyone connected to the structural injustice in the way they engage in collective action to address it. As such, Young attributes responsibility for structural injustices to everyone connected to the production of the structural injustice, which can go beyond a specific society (McKeown, 2021). To illustrate this, Young discussed two forms of responsibility in relation to each other: the social connection model and the liability model, which will be discussed further in the following section.

### **3. 2. Responsibilities for Structural Injustices**

Young initially identified two different models of responsibility: the social connection model and the liability model of responsibility. The liability model of responsibility explains the individual responsibility of persons for their actions. Within this model, responsibility can be regarded as the legal or moral reasoning to establish blame for harm or wrongdoing (Young, 2011). The liability model thus requires a causal connection between the person's action and the consequences of those actions. On the other hand, the social connection model involves indirect responsibility that individuals have by virtue of connection to structural injustices. The model assumes that individuals have indirect responsibilities for structural injustices because they contribute through their actions to the processes that produce unjust



outcomes (Young, 2011, 119). To further explain these processes that create structural injustice, I will shortly describe Young's sweatshop example (Young, 2011)<sup>5</sup>.

Many Western fashion companies have outsourced their production to manufacturing companies in the GS, including India and Bangladesh, where production is cheap which allows fashion companies to respond quickly to new shifts in consumer demands (Cachon, & Swinney, 2011; Caro, & Martínez-de-Albéniz, 2010). This process of responding quickly to changing demands in fashion is called fast fashion. Within the fast fashion industry, the labourers in manufacturing companies are often subject to devastating treatment and labour violations (Young, 2006). The fast fashion industry consists of a complex chain of production and distribution involving dozens of contractually distinct entities that bring the clothes manufactured in one place to the stores in which people buy them. The firms higher up the chain often have no legal responsibility for the policies and operations of the firms below with which they contract (Young, 2006). In line with the social connection model of responsibility, there is no clear direct responsibility to be assigned to any different agent within the multi-layered fashion industry for the labour violations at the bottom of the production chain. The conditions in which labourers at the bottom of this system suffer constitute an injustice in the form of domination, coercion, and need-deprivation within a global system of vast inequalities (Young, 2006, 111).

The sweatshop example depicts how the actions of the different actors constrain the opportunities of people at the bottom of the manufacturing chain through domination, coercion, and need-deprivation (Young, 2006, 111). Additionally, it illustrates how

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<sup>5</sup> Definition of sweatshop according to Young (2006, 108): "Many of the articles of clothing, shoes, and other small consumer items whose production is labour-intensive are produced in relatively small manufacturing centres in less-developed countries, which operate at the bottom of a chain of hundreds of distinct companies. The vast majority of workers are female, and often as young as thirteen or fourteen; often treated in dominative and abusive ways. [...] violations of the most basic health and safety standards are normal."

responsibilities for structural injustices are often difficult to attribute due to the complex, hierarchical nature of societies. The sweatshop example explains how people by virtue of being part of a structured society or concept can be held responsible for injustices through the social connection model.

Additionally, Young discussed the model of political responsibility. Similarly to the social connection model, this model assumes that one participates in social processes that have some unjust outcomes. The form of responsibility, then, is political in these senses that acting on one's responsibilities involves joining with others in public discourse to persuade one another about courses of collective action that will contribute to ameliorating the problem (Young, 2003, 15). I will show how this applies to citizens in section 4.3. *Citizens' Responsibility*.

The social connection model and political model of responsibility can be applied to the structural injustices evident within the European migration crisis. Due to the complex, hierarchical nature of the European migration regime, no single individual can be held directly responsible, it is rather through social connection that responsibility arises. Additionally, as can be seen from the sweatshop example, structural injustices extend beyond the nation-state and can be perceived globally through transnational accounts of (1) domination, and (2) oppression and their relation to structural injustice. Domination can be understood as the institutional constraint on self-determination, and oppression can be understood as the institutional constraint on self-development embedded in exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence, also referred to by Young as the 'five faces of oppression' (Young, 1990; McKeown, 2021). This can also be seen in the European migration regime: border control policies dominate and oppress refugees in such a way that they are unable to determine their own freedom of movement (Carens, 2013).

### 3. 3. Deliberate structural injustices

Structural injustices thus put constraints on people's self-determination and self-development. McKeown (2023) further elaborates on the concept of structural injustices by arguing that there are three different types of structural injustice, namely: pure, avoidable, and deliberate structural injustices which depend on certain power structures which can further constrain people's self-determination and self-development. Pure structural injustices reflect Young's definition of structural injustices in that all of the actors are constrained to the point where it is very difficult for them not to participate in reproducing the injustice, and the consequences of their actions are unintended (McKeown, 2023, 16). Avoidable structural injustices challenge the idea of pure structural justice in the sense that not all agents are objectively constrained by the structures to the extent that they cannot change them; there are agents in positions of power that could act to change unjust structures but fail to do so. In cases of avoidable structural injustice, the outcomes may be unintended, but they are foreseeable and avoidable (McKeown, 2023, 17). The last type of structural injustices McKeown identifies are deliberate structural injustices. Deliberate structural injustices are structural injustices where:

[...] powerful agents recognise that there are groups who are disadvantaged by social structures, take advantage of that situation, deliberately reproduce the injustice, and reap benefits by exploiting the disadvantaged. In cases of deliberate structural injustice, all agents are constrained, but powerful agents have enough room to manoeuvre to be able to change the situation (McKeown, 2023, 17).

In deliberate structural injustices, powerful agents not only have the power to change the situation in which the injustice occurs, but they actively maintain the injustice because they significantly benefit from it (McKeown, 2023, 17, 18). Deliberate structural injustices thus exist when an agent has the ability to change the outcomes of a structural injustice, but deliberately chooses not to act upon it to benefit from the structural injustices by deliberately choosing to maintain the structural injustice. Therefore, the European states have, by implementing border control policies focused on humanitarian assistance - which are intrinsically created to keep non-Europeans out while they simultaneously benefit European states through positive discrimination - created a deliberate structural injustice in which the large part of refugees in need of protection is unable to receive the protection. By offering humanitarian assistance to neighbouring states in return for border control and the detention of refugees, European states are shifting their unconditional protective competence. By deliberately initiating policies for the detention of refugees in neighbouring countries and by deliberately allowing only high-skilled, high-educated people to enter Europe, European states have created a structural injustice where freedom of movement and protection are deliberately withheld for the majority of asylum seekers.

To further illustrate this, I will discuss migration as a structural injustice in the next section by elaborating on how, historically, domination and oppression have been evident in power structures between the GN and GS, typically in terms of colonialism. The relation between the perceived different social positions between the GN and the GS and the collective action of the people in the GN has led to constrained opportunities and minimal benefits for people from the GS while it has led to increased opportunities and benefits for the GN (Lu, 2011 & 2017; Young, 2011). The GN/ GS divide has been created through colonisation, slavery, and the industrial revolution and still has many consequences for the

international community, including migration flows. In the following section, I will give a more in-depth description of the GN/ GS divide and its consequences in terms of the European migration crisis to generate a more in-depth understanding of European states' responsibility for deliberative structural injustices following the liability model.

### **3. 4. Migration and the Global North - Global South Divide**

The current migration regime of the EU is designed so that it targets specific racial groups leading to restrictions on movement that are excessive and burdensome for the targeted groups while they form an advantage for others which correlates to the historically persistent GN/ GS divide. It is important for the essence of this thesis to understand the privilege of the GN and its relation to the treatment of migrants entering Europe. Historically, the GN has had a beneficial position within the global order which has allowed them to disproportionately increase their economic and social capital and with that, their power (Schelling, 1992). When considering historical relations between the GN and the GS, the GS has been subject to colonialism and imperialism initiated mainly by Western European countries. The effects of European colonialism and imperialism are felt globally in the form of racism towards non-European and non-white people, economic inequality, and unequal power relations (Dozono, 2020). European imperial and colonial states have had a central role in transforming the global order which is expressed in terms of inter-state contributions to global inequality (Fine, 2016, 129). This inter-state inequality is the result of both imperialistic extraction and exploitation of natural resources and capital and labour power from the occupied domain through a range of dominating practices. These dominating practices include, amongst others, slavery, indentured labour, and state-authorised monopolies. Furthermore, the role of formal and informal modes of enforcement of imperial power has also had a significant role in the structuring and restructuring of the organisation of

global legal, economic, and political order (Milanovic, 2011; Owen, 2020). The effects of the historical process of colonialism and imperialism are still felt in the form of structural injustices through the historical constraints on self-determination and self-development in the form of domination and oppression. These have led to a transformation of the transnational social structure in that the processes of domination and oppression have led to increased opportunities and benefits for the GN while they have simultaneously led to decreased opportunities and benefits for the GS (Young, 2006).

The GN/GS divide and the structural injustice pertaining to it is further elaborated on by Carens (2013) who argued that being born in a Western state comes with immediate access to opportunity relative to being born in a non-Western state. He argues that one either has an advantaged or disadvantaged social position and therefore increased or decreased access to economic and social opportunities. This account of the transnational social structure extends to instances of migration: according to Carens, freedom of movement or 'voluntary immigration' depends on birthright citizenship and unilateral state control which determine the institutional rules that enable or constrain human agency (2013). Freedom of movement seems to be a stratifying value in society nowadays in that the geopolitical implications of borders and the right to cross borders differ per person and nationality (Owen, 2020). This perspective is further elaborated on by Thomas Schelling who stated that it is racial apartheid, stemming from colonialist relations, that determine border control practices. He stated the following:

We live in a world that is one-fifth rich and four-fifths poor; the rich are segregated into the rich countries and the poor into poor countries; the rich are predominantly lighter skinned and

the poor darker skinned; most of the poor live in “homelands” that are physically remote, often separated by oceans and great distances from the rich. Migration on any great scale is impermissible (Schelling 1992, 200).

The historical account of domination and oppression in terms of colonialism and imperialism are inevitably linked with migration today in that one’s citizenship determines the extent of one’s migration possibilities reflected in EU migration policies. Increased inter-state global inequality and increased racialised segregation of the global order due to colonialism and imperialism have led to more closed migration regimes specifically targeting racial groups in such a way that immigration controls have become a tool to maintain racial segregation on an international scale (Fine, 2016: 129; Owen, 2020). In the context of this thesis, it is important to mention the impacts of racism concerning transnational social structures and institutional structures as they have an impact on migration policies and refugee treatment across national and international spheres. While migration within Europe has become easier due to the Schengen Arrangement, migration towards Europe has become more difficult in that European border control is subject to an assessment process based on racial biases and selectivity (Owen, 2020). Additionally, while wealthy and powerful liberal democratic states have formally bound themselves to principles of racial non-discrimination in immigration policy, ethnicity still plays a role in contemporary immigration policies (Joppke, 2005; Owen, 2020). Particularly, even though principles of non-discrimination are promoted within European immigration policies, there has been a more general shift in Western state immigration policy towards ‘selecting by merit’ as part of a ‘global race for talent’ as can be observed in European border control policies based on humanitarianism.

This serves in itself both generally to advantage the migration options of persons with access to high-quality education, and developed economies (Owen, 2020). However, a focus on skilled migration policies may further contribute to the reproduction of global inequalities and might lead to others being left behind in their opportunities for migration. What can be observed is that those who are typically left behind, or even excluded, by such migration policies are likely to be members of already unequally disadvantaged racialised groups (Owen, 2020). While European migration policies might thus seem race-neutral and anti-discriminatory, they have a significant negative effect on some groups. It is through the selecting by merit that policies of ‘othering’ are created which allow for the maintenance of racial biases within anti-discriminatory policies evident within the GN/ GS divide (Owen, 2020). The current migration regime of the EU is designed so that it targets specific racial groups leading to restrictions on movement that are excessive and burdensome for the targeted groups while they form an advantage for others. Still, not all European states have initiated policies meant to positively discriminate certain groups over others in their freedom of movement. However, according to Parekh (2020, in Schmidt, 2021) “the perhaps individually permissive actions of Western states can converge to create conditions of structural injustices; conditions under which the promise of refuge remains out of reach for the great majority of those who desperately need it”. The national legislation thus does not create an injustice in itself, but rather through the combination with legislation from other states due to failed harmonisation attempts (Chapter 2). The structural injustices to be perceived are thus the unjust outcome of interactions of generally legitimate state and intra-state policies (Owen, 2020).

By diffusing their responsibility and failing to protect migrants against instances of structural injustice, the EU fails to honour its unconditional protective competence. This in



turn leads to an enhancement of the inequalities already persistent within the transnational social order and the migration regime. As a result of the EU's reluctance to respond to the needs of migrants, many European border states have become overloaded with the increasing influx of (irregular) migrants. This is problematic as it will only enhance the European's inability to answer their unconditional protective competence. However, the increase in incoming migrants and the racial biases persistent in society, are not an excuse for states to not act upon their duties. Therefore, by implementing border control policies focused on humanitarian assistance, European states have created a deliberate structural injustice in which a large part of refugees are structurally denied protection from European states, while European states benefit from the maintaining of the structural injustice through positive discrimination. European states thus have a responsibility in the form of a liability, as defined by Young (2006), in that their contribution to the deliberate structural injustices within the European migration regime is clear.

The former sections have illustrated how states can be considered responsible for the structural injustices existing within the European Migration Crisis. Specifically, through the implementation of border control policies based on humanitarian assistance framed in such a way as to prevent the gross amount of refugees in need of protection from entering Europe. By doing so, European states are neglecting their unconditional protective competence as established in the 1951 Refugee Convention, to which they have a responsibility to adhere. In the following section, I will discuss the increase of populism within European politics and its influence on structural injustices within the European Migration Crisis to offer yet another perspective on the responsibilities of European states for deliberate structural injustices within the European Migration Crisis. I will argue that due to the populist focus on anti-immigration, racial biases have increased despite efforts for anti-discrimination by the

EU, which have in turn increased structural injustices within the European migration regime. Additionally, I will go deeper into the political responsibility of European citizens. I will illustrate that next to European states having a responsibility in the form of a liability, European citizens have a political responsibility to address structural injustices within the European Migration Crisis in the sense that they are connected to them in line with the social connection model of responsibility.

#### **4. Populism in Relation to Migration as a Structural Injustice**

In this chapter, I will discuss the relationship between populism in Europe and migration to further illustrate European states' responsibility for deliberate structural injustices within the European Migration Crisis. Additionally, I will discuss how individual European citizens can be said to have a political responsibility for the structural injustices evident in the European migration crisis. To understand how individual European citizens have a political responsibility for structural injustices evident in the European migration crisis, I will provide an analysis of the increase in populist sentiments and the increase in political support for populist parties in Europe. Therefore, it is important to first develop an understanding of the concept of populism which will explain why certain border control policies are still maintained, despite their negative effects on refugees in need of protection.

##### **4. 1. Populism and Migration**

Populism can be understood as a political ideology that is typically considered anti-immigration, anti-multiculturalism, and anti-pluralism (Valeri, 2019). More concretely: populism is an ideology that homogenises the will of 'the people' and promotes it against the will of the elites; operationalises emotion over reason and promotes a binary choice between accepting and rejecting a particular position, which undermines the ability of deliberation to reach a solution that might protect a range of diverse interests (Young, A. L., 2018 in Smet, & Stoyanova, 2022). Moreover, populism responds to some inherent and ingrained instabilities and tensions in the structure of liberal democracy. These are reflected in three interrelated dichotomies within liberal democracies; the collective versus the individual, the universal versus the particular, and plurality versus unity (Walker, 2019). The first dichotomy represents the balance needed between the interests of the collective and the interests of the individual within a society. Individual interests are protected by human rights law,

specifically with regard to excessive and disproportionate limitations of individual rights in the name of collective rights (Young, 2018, 29)<sup>6</sup>. The second dichotomy represents the search for a balance between the universal and the particular, or the global versus the national.

Where universal values are considered to give a basis to human rights which have a global reach, and where the particular describes the interests of a distinct political community. The third dichotomy implies a tension between the plurality of identities that individuals within a state might have (such as; ethnicity, culture, language, religion, and gender) on the one hand and the need for social cohesion and integrity of the whole nation-state on the other hand (Smet, & Stoyanova, 2022).

According to Walker (2019), liberal democracies are in a constant search for balance between the three dichotomies identified. This balance can be destabilised through transnationalism (Oklopčic, 2019). According to Mitchell (2016), transnationalism refers to that which takes place across national borders and is often used to describe both material ties and symbolic flows and interconnections between nations and people. It aims to promote the interest of the collective, the universal, and the plurality of states. Transnationalism is often used to describe a form of contemporary migration in which migrants form long-standing social ties and allegiances to more than one national community (Mitchell, 2016).

Additionally, transnationalism describes new forms of governance and the development of institutions and social spaces that are organised across borders and which either facilitate or restrict cross-border flows (Mitchell, 2016). Particularly within transnationalism's reference to contemporary migration, it forms a challenge to the balance sought within liberal democracy by presenting a shift away from nationalism to pluralism and multiculturalism

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<sup>6</sup> According to Alison Young (2018, 29), this can also be represented as a tension between the protection of human rights and the protection of democracy which emerges when human rights law is allowed to override legislation adopted by the democratically elected parliament.

within a single nation-state. As democracies are bounded communities of citizens with equal rights; the claims of migrants, as non-citizens, pose a challenge that destabilise these communities through their appeal to universal values in favour of inclusion, further affecting the three tensions mentioned (Schotel, 2013, 54). Specifically, because of migrants' claim for universalism and inclusivity, they have been a major target for populists who are typically against the inclusion of non-citizens as they fear the disruption of a society's homogeneity. According to Modebadze (2019), populism draws strength from public opposition to multiculturalism, mass migration processes, and the perceived 'decline' of national identity and national culture which according to populists can be attributed to the increase in the number of migrants and with that multiculturalism. The European migration crisis contributed to the strengthening of populist nationalist ideas in Europe which criticises European politics, defends the idea of closing the borders, and opposes migration processes to Europe (Modebadze, 2019, 90). Therefore, individual European citizens, by supporting populist ideology focused on exclusion of non-native citizens, social cohesion and homogeneity, influence national and international migration policies focused on exclusion. Therefore, the increase of populist sentiments in Europe enforces the structural injustices already existing in the European migration regime by further promoting the exclusion of migrants in Europe.

Migrants can counteract the populist appeal to exclusion by appealing to their basic human rights and universal values for inclusion with regard to asylum claims. However, the universal application of human rights goes against the populist appeal to the particular which undermines liberal democracies (universalism versus the particular). According to Kostakopoulou (1998), the exclusion of migrants goes both ways in the sense that it affects both migrants trying to enter Europe and migrants already in Europe. Populism has a fixed

conception of the identity that a member of a nation or society should have and anyone who does not fit within that fixed conception is at risk of being excluded. The fact that European border control policies remain existent despite their heavy critique and their impact on structural injustices is partly rooted in the rise of populism as a response to transnationalism, the European migration crisis, and the perceived destabilisation of national communities as a result of increased multiculturalism (Bosniak, 2008). As populism constitutes a threat to liberal democracy, the governments of European member states have an interest in decreasing support for populist parties. One way in which they try to do this is by strictly securing the external borders of the EU as they argue it might then be easier to gain popular support for more liberal policies concerning migrants already on the territory of the state (Bosniak, 2008, 38 in Smet, & Stoyanova, 2022). Therefore, many governments, to protect national politics, have structured their migration policies in such a way to only enable admission in degrees of exceptionalism, as a form of positive discrimination, to increase support for liberal policies while supporting external European border control measures. By implementing national migration policies focused on positive discrimination governments can protect their liberal democracy by appealing to a certain degree to populist fears of destabilisation. To illustrate this further, I will introduce two case examples from the Netherlands.

#### **4. 2. Two Case Studies: Populism in the Netherlands**

Similarly to the rest of Europe, populism in the Netherlands has been on the rise since the increase in mass migration processes and the subsequent increase in multiculturalism (Harteveld, et al., 2022). From the following case examples, it will be shown that populism in the Netherlands has a negative effect on the treatment of refugees and non-Dutch people living in the Netherlands. Dutch populists rearticulate dominant discourses of ‘real Dutchness’ in connection with renovated politics of inequality. Right-wing Dutch populist

discourse utilises the binary between ‘autochthones’ (of ‘Dutch descent’) and ‘allochthones’ (of ‘foreign descent’) which was introduced by mainstream political parties in the late-twentieth century (Jones, 2016). While officially based on descent, the binary connotes a racialised idea of true Dutchness (Yanow, & Van der Haar, 2013, 227; Jones, 2014b, 74-5)<sup>7</sup>. As a result, Dutch politics has increasingly focused on the exclusion of non-Dutch or non-European people to try to maintain liberal democracy which is threatened by the increasingly multicultural, transnationalist Dutch society (Harteveld, et al., 2022). I will illustrate in this section, how national governments have a responsibility in the form of a liability by the deliberate implementation of policies geared towards the exclusion of migrants. Additionally, this section will illustrate how European citizens, as members of a political community, have a political responsibility to respond to increased populist sentiments in national governments.

#### **4. 2. 1. “Meer of Minder Marokkanen?”**

In 2014, the populist Dutch politician Geert Wilders held a party conference to celebrate the party’s achievements in recent elections. During the party conference, Wilders asked his spectators to answer three questions which according to him defined his party, the PVV (Party for Freedom). The first question concerned whether the PVV and their supporters wanted to be more or less involved within the EU to which the answer was clearly ‘less’. The second question asked whether PVV supporters wanted to see more or less support for the Dutch labour party PvdA, to which the answer was again ‘less’. The third question concerns a controversial question for which Wilders and the PVV received a lot of backlash. To quote Wilders exactly: *“The third question is, and I am not allowed to say this as someone could*

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<sup>7</sup> Racialisation in Dutch political discourse utilises a variety of signifiers to construct difference, such as appearances (descent/external bodily features, dress), things deemed ‘cultural’ (such as behaviour, religion, sexuality, speech and accent) and class (Jones, 2016).

*prosecute me for this. And there might be people from D66 (Democrats 66) who might start a trial after this. However, freedom of opinion is an important value within our society. We have not said anything which is not allowed or that is not correct. So I am asking you: do you want more or less Moroccans in the Hague and the Netherlands?"* The answer to this question was a clear 'LESS'. Geert Wilders continued by saying that he wanted to take the passports of Moroccan criminals and stimulate the emigration of Moroccans to take care of that wish.

Wilders' statements led to a public trial concerning the limits of freedom of opinion and the spreading of hate speech. In 2020, six years after the incident, the Public Prosecutor's Office found Wilders guilty of hate speech and group insult (NU.nl., 2014).

This incident illustrates how populism within the Netherlands has a significant effect on how people of non-Dutch and non-European nationality are perceived and how they are typically treated by populist supporters. Geert Wilders' statements illustrate the dimension between inclusion and exclusion within a society and illustrate the populist demand for homogeneity and social cohesion within nation-states which clashes with liberal democracies' call for inclusion. Yet, the extent to which inclusion within a 'seemingly' liberal democracy like the Netherlands is actually realised is debatable due to policies of externalisation at European borders which affect national migration policies. This can be further illustrated by elaborating on another case study concerning refugee treatment in the Netherlands.

#### **4. 2. 2. Refugee Treatment in the Netherlands**

The Netherlands is currently dealing with an asylum crisis; there is a gap between asylum places available and the number of asylum seekers. It was expected that this gap would amount to 51.000 places by the end of 2022. According to NOS (2022), around 22.820 asylum seekers (under which 3000 children) were placed in crisis shelters or temporary shelters managed by the COA (Dutch Central Organ for Asylum Seekers). The number of



refugees migrating to the Netherlands increased after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war at the beginning of 2022. However, next to Ukrainian refugees (European), there are thousands of refugees coming from countries like Syria, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Palestine (non-European) who are also in need of protection (UNHCR Nederland, n.d.). To accommodate the increase in asylum seekers, State Secretary Van der Burg from the Ministry of Security and Justice suggested that municipalities should only offer refuge to Ukrainian refugees (NOS, 2022a). However, the Dutch Human Rights College (Mensenrechten College) claims that offering more places, especially for Ukrainian refugees by clearing up asylum centres would constitute discrimination (NOS, 2022a). By struggling to find asylum places for refugees, specifically non-European refugees, the Dutch cabinet and responsible authorities have created situations in which non-European refugees are rejected effective protection. Specifically, in the asylum centre in Ter Apel, several human rights violations have taken place due to the centre's over-crowdedness. There have been several reports of separate incidents where hundreds of people had to sleep outside, including children; received expired and moldy food, and where insufficient hygiene led to several cases of mumps, measles, polio, rubella, diphtheria and tetanus disease (Kamphorst, 2022; NOS, 2022b; 2023). Additionally, the Dutch government has again requested increased border control at Tunisian, Italian, and Turkish borders and has initiated policies for the establishment of safe third countries for the returning of refugees and detention for rejected asylum seekers.

The case studies illustrate how the Dutch government, by responding to populism, continuously fails to meet its responsibility to protect incoming refugees. In doing so, the Dutch government has created a system in which non-European refugees are subject to deliberate structural injustices. Furthermore, by attempting to differentiate between

Europeans and non-Europeans in the offering of refuge and by enforcing border control policies at the European border, the Dutch government appeals to populist demand in their migration policies by promoting exclusion rather than inclusion and thus has a direct responsibility for the deliberate structural injustices within the European migration crisis in the form of a liability.

Additionally, these examples show how internal, national migration policies affect external, international migration policies. The political stance of individual European citizens thus affects international migration policies and the reproduction of structural injustices in the European migration regime. As can be gathered from the Dutch case examples, Dutch citizens have issued their political responsibility by participating in liberal democracy to ameliorate populism's effects on Dutch migration policies. Yet, refugees in the Netherlands are still subject to structural injustices in part stemming from populism's fear of multiculturalism as can be concluded from the more recent example of the treatment of non-European refugees. Dutch citizens, and therefore European citizens in line with the social connection model, have a political responsibility to address these issues and to influence national politics into the adoption of more liberal migration policies to account for refugees' protection needs as further illustrated below.

It can thus be concluded that populism feeds into policies of externalisation which relates to both national migration policies and international migration policies. Decisions about internal, national migration policies affect and are interrelated with, decisions about external, international migration policies in the sense of transnational social structures which have led to conditions under which the promise of refuge remains out of reach for the great majority of those who desperately need it (Parekh, 2020). Governments, by attempting to maintain liberal democracy and thereby appealing in part to populist demands, thus feed into

the structural injustices that are already in place. Therefore, by 1) supporting migration policies focused on externalisation, 2) supporting border control policies based on humanitarian assistance, and 3) appealing to populist demand, there is a causal connection between the actions of European states and the treatment of refugees. As such, European states have a responsibility in the form of a liability for the deliberate structural injustices within the European migration crisis because, through the above-mentioned actions, European states are neglecting their pledged unconditional protective competence resulting in the structurally unjust treatment of refugees.

#### **4. 3. Citizens' Responsibilities**

Apart from European states having a responsibility in the form of a liability for deliberate structural injustices within the European migration crisis, European citizens can be said to have a political responsibility for the structural injustices in line with the social connection model. Individual European citizens have a responsibility to address issues of injustice within migration in the sense that they are all connected to structural injustice through membership of a political nation (Hameleers, 2019). This relates to the social connection model of responsibility which assumes that individuals have indirect responsibilities for structural injustices because they contribute through their actions to the processes that produce unjust outcomes (Young, 2006). With regard to the European Migration Crisis, this corresponds to how populism affects national, democratic governments in their migration policies. Citizens, as members of a political nation, are inevitably connected to this. It is difficult to ascribe direct responsibilities to citizens as they have not directly created the policies which have created the structural injustices. However, they can be said to have a political responsibility for these injustices in the sense that they have a responsibility to counteract problems populism poses to the treatment of refugees. Acting on

those responsibilities involves joining others in public discourse to persuade one another about courses of collective action that will contribute to ameliorating the problem of populism and its effects on migration policies and, therefore, structural injustices (Young, 2003, 15). This can also be seen from the Dutch case examples where Dutch citizens addressed the populist sentiments within Wilders' speech which led to heated debates on inclusion and exclusion in the Netherlands and led to Wilders' public sentencing. However, refugee treatment in the Netherlands has not improved nearly eight years after the "Meer of minder Marokkanen" incident which has led to increased migration policies of exclusion. These have subsequently led to several human rights violations in the treatment of refugees. Dutch citizens, and therefore European citizens, have a political responsibility to address structural injustices perpetuated by populism within migration because through collective action they can influence national migration policies which can in turn positively influence international migration policies for the better treatment of refugees.

There is possibly a further distinction to be made between the types of responsibility European citizens have: actively supporting populism seems to be a different kind of relationship to the problem than merely being a citizen of a country where populism is a problem. Additionally, not all citizens might be aware of their connection to, and political responsibility for structural injustices evident within the European migration crisis. Yet to further define these would be beyond the scope of this bachelor thesis. Therefore, within the scope of this bachelor thesis, it can be concluded that European citizens have a political responsibility to address the unjust outcomes of national and international migration policies in line with the social connection model for deliberate structural injustices within the European migration crisis which are maintained through populism.

## 5. Conclusion

This bachelor thesis discussed the European migration crisis from a political science, political theory, and legal perspective. Specifically, this bachelor thesis looked into the allocation of different responsibilities evident within the European migration crisis. It can be established that the European migration crisis is subject to deliberate structural injustices. Incoming migrants are consistently put into situations in which they are deprived of the means to develop and deprived of their freedom of movement through the process of positive discrimination which continues to benefit European states. The border control policies initiated by European states focused on humanitarian assistance as a way to outsource border control, are a means to control the movement of migrants in and towards Europe through aid, trade, and development as a way to deliberately separate European and non-European citizens. These policies are maintained through the enforcement of already existing power structures between the GN and the GS, focused on segregation and exclusion, and increased populist support in favour of the exclusion of migrants in Europe. European states have an unconditional protective competence, which they can account to, to recognise and appeal to the protection needs of refugees in line with the 1951 Refugee Convention, but are deliberately choosing, through the instalment of border control policies maintained through the GN/ GS divide and specifically populism, to avoid this protective competence. Therefore, the European migration crisis is a deliberate structural injustice, for which European states have a responsibility in line with the liability model.

The influence of populism on structural injustices evident within the European migration crisis is illustrated by elaborating on two case examples from the Netherlands. This global-local lens depicts how national migration policies affect international migration policies. As mentioned, structural injustices evident within the European migration crisis are

perpetuated by populism and European citizens have a political responsibility in line with the social connection model to address this. This political responsibility requires acting on the responsibilities European citizens have by being part of a political nation. This involves joining others in public discourse to persuade one another about courses of collective action that will contribute to ameliorating the problem of populism and its effects on structural injustices within the context of the European migration crisis. By acting upon their political responsibility, European citizens can influence national migration policies which can, in turn, positively influence international migration policies for the better treatment of refugees.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the responsibilities for structural injustices evident within the European migration crisis fall upon two entities. As such; *“The European migration crisis constitutes a deliberate structural injustice for which European states are responsible in the form of a liability. The structural injustices evident are perpetuated by populism and European citizens have a political responsibility to address this injustice in line with the social connection model of responsibility.”*

## 6. Limitations and Future Research

Whereas many concepts relevant to the European migration crisis have been discussed, there are some points that would have enabled a more critical analysis of the different responsibilities for the structural injustices persistent within the European migration crisis.

Firstly, this bachelor thesis could have gone into a legal loophole, as further elaborated on by Stoyanova, & Smet (2022), evident in Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights which offers yet another perspective on how European states are deliberately avoiding their unconditional protective competence. Future research on the responsibilities of European states for deliberate structural injustices within the European migration crisis should look into this.

Second, populism is portrayed solely as an ideology focused on the preservation of the nation-state and the exclusion of anything and anyone that might threaten the national identity. However, some people supporting populism might benefit from it in the sense that they are disadvantaged themselves. Often, the people supporting populist parties stem from lower-income families and have a lower education level who fear that migrants might take over their jobs (Schmuck, & Matthes, 2015). This constitutes relevant future research into the political responsibilities of European citizens for structural injustices.

Additionally, as mentioned, European citizens supporting populism and European citizens not supporting populism have a different degree of political responsibility. To address this issue was beyond the scope of this bachelor thesis, but constitutes relevant future research as it would allow for a more clear understanding of the different responsibilities for the structural injustices within the European migration crisis. Additionally, not all citizens might be aware of their political responsibility and social connection to the structural

injustices in the European migration regime. Future research should look further into how this can be addressed.

Furthermore, this bachelor thesis fails to give any solutions to the deliberate structural injustices evident in the European migration crisis. Whereas it is easy to suggest European citizens should not vote for populist parties in line with their political responsibility, their individual situations should be taken into account as outlined above. Additionally, no solutions are given for European states' responsibility.

Therefore, there are relevant opportunities for further research into the European migration crisis as a deliberate structural injustice and the responsibility of European states in the form of a liability, and the political responsibility of European citizens in line with the social connection model to address this.



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